

Minds in Revolution: Radical Worldview Formation and Dissolution as Paradigmatic Shifts

Hannah Galen^{a1}

^aDoctoral Researcher, Leeds Beckett University, UK

Abstract

This paper is about the change beneath belief change: the rebuilding of how a person decides what is true. It argues radicalisation is the formation of a personal worldview, a *Weltanschauung* governing not only *what* a person believes but *how*: what counts as evidence, whose word is trusted, how convictions are justified. On this account, ideology is always present. Absorbed whole or assembled from fragments, the worldview is personally built and ideology's apparent absence is its private construction. Deradicalisation that changes belief content while leaving this epistemic architecture intact tends to fail, producing compliance without transformation and leaving the person open to the next totalising framework.

The framework draws on three fields. From philosophy of science it takes Kuhn, to trace how a worldview consolidates and shifts, Lakatos, to explain why it resists revision, and Feyerabend, to identify the conditions under which a closed framework dissolves. Through psychology it sketches the Biographical Salience Map, which holds that radicalisation runs through life domains and personal constructs weighted differently in each person, accounting for multifinality (identical conditions, but different outcomes). Epistemology then links the two, explaining how these knowledge-forming tendencies occur within Kuhn's paradigm sequence. Drawing from autobiographical accounts, the paper argues genuine deradicalisation is a deep ideological self-transformation, a reconstruction of how a person comes to believe, named here *transilience*: the restoration of the capacity to build one's own worldview on one's own terms, with sharpened evidence scrutiny. It reframes why content-based interventions can backfire and points practice toward conditions for epistemic pluralism rather than supplying 'corrected beliefs'.

Article History

Received May 13, 2026

Accepted Aug 22, 2026

Published Sep 25, 2026

Keywords: Deradicalisation, Weltanschauung, Epistemic Shift, Transilience

Introduction

In Kubrick's (1971) *'A Clockwork Orange'*, a young man with ultra-violence as a way of life is subjected to a behavioural conditioning programme rendering him incapable of harm. Later, with the conditioning undone, he returns to his old violent self, depicting a case of enforced disengagement rather than true deradicalisation (Horgan, 2009). Genuine psychological rupture with extremist ideologies is taken to offer deeper safeguard against reoffending rather than disengaging in violent behaviour alone (Altier et al. 2021), thus, to

¹ Corresponding Author Contact: Hannah Galen, Email: hannahgalen00@gmail.com

understand true deradicalisation, it becomes paramount to break down the mechanisms behind radical belief change.

In CVE literature, models such as ABC (Khalil et al., 2019), depluralisation/repluralisation (Koehler 2017), and Phoenix (Silke et al. 2021) have advanced our grasp of which factors shift in deradicalisation and when, yet leaving open the prior question of how belief itself is formed, defended and dropped. This paper makes two arguments. First, that radicalisation is the construction of a personal worldview governing not only *what* a person believes but *how*: what they accept as evidence, whose word they trust, how they justify their convictions (a *Weltanschauung*). Second, lasting deradicalisation requires a self-reconfiguring of that worldview at the level of *how* it was formed, and not merely changing their content, if iatrogenic risk is to be avoided. The argument draws on three disciplines: philosophy of science showing how belief systems form and collapse, epistemology explaining mechanisms of justification and defense, and psychology illustrating the lived experience of change.

Firstly, any account of deradicalisation must settle the place of ideology. Many in the CVE field do not see it as a central driver, treating disengagement as the more practical, and perhaps more realistic, route to preventing acts of terror. This paper's concern is different: the deep ideological transformation undergone by those who have truly deradicalised. Building its framework from Holbrook's (2025) report, here ideology is positioned as the defining element categorising an act of violence as terrorist, since an act with no ideological cause behind it, whether political or religious, is not terror at all, becoming the very threshold separating terrorism from other types of violence.

The issue then lies in how ideology is defined. Read narrowly, as a codified, orthodox body of doctrine mastered through study and faithfully reproduced, ideology can appear absent in many cases, since few radicalised individuals hold anything so systematic. Read in its broader sociological sense, it is a shared system of beliefs that shapes how a person sees the world, and on this reading it is rarely absent at all. Koehler (2025) has already advocated for this broader approach in CVE, drawing on Freeden's morphology of ideologies to argue that a functional ideology requires no mastery of doctrine, and is carried more through social and emotional channels than through study, so that what looks like the absence of ideology is often the effect of a limited definition.

Taking much of what we believe on the word of people we trust is how knowledge ordinarily works – we assign authority, assess reliability in testimony and form beliefs. Within a radical group, however, testimony becomes the main channel through which one builds their worldview. This reframes the contest between ideology and social bonds, defining radicalisation not necessarily as a solid doctrinal set of ideas, but as a worldview that receives little rebuttal and becomes crystallised.

There is much debate as to how radicalisation can occur via ‘hybrid ideologies’ and what this paper attempts to show is that the problem of radicalisation isn’t only the content of ideologies, or if they oppose or converge (Horgan & Shayler, 2026), but more so in the self-sealing thinking in which they are formed. If content was their defining feature these cases would be puzzling; but here they are expected, because a worldview is always personally constructed. With this, the defining feature of radicalisation becomes the way beliefs are held: a closed structure, rigorous within its own limits yet shut off from outside evidence and unable to weigh contradiction.

To this end, the paper draws from public accounts of individuals formerly engaged in radical ideologies, from different sides of political spectrum, each of whom describes undergoing a profound change in worldview. These autobiographies were chosen for their unusual depth of self-reflection, setting out not only what the authors came to believe but how their way of holding belief changed, in enough detail to allow the psychological and epistemological examination this paper undertakes. The sample is therefore purposive rather than representative, selected for introspective richness across opposed movements.

The framework for reading these accounts is drawn from philosophy of science, in particular Thomas Kuhn's account of how scientific paradigms form, resist change, and give way. Applied to the individual mind, it casts radicalisation and its undoing as the making and breaking of a personal paradigm, a worldview governing not only what a person believes but how.

1. The Weltanschauung: Radicalisation as Formation of a Personal Paradigm

1.1 From Collective, Ideological Paradigms to Individual Worldviews

Based in the history of natural science, in ‘*The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*’, Kuhn (1962) argued science is not as evidence-led as people assume, and even the most

rigorous minds struggle to revise their models in face of contradicting evidence. The book became influential across disciplines, with one psychologist writing him "...the publisher does not know that this is a book about Psychology" (Boring, 1962, in Richards & Daston, 2016, p.83). Years later, a book written by a physicist would become the most cited across the social sciences (Green, 2016), a sign that history of science has something to teach about how humans come to believe and claim to know things.

Kuhn introduced the term *paradigm shift* describing the sudden overthrow of one dominant scientific framework by another. He argued that rationality and evidence alone cannot explain these shifts, being largely driven by the personal commitments of scientists: their resistance to self-refutation; their investment in existing models; and the social conditions under which science operates. The same is true when looking at radicalisation, where their counterparts are cognitive rigidity; dedication to a 'cause'; and the social conditions allowing the formation of radical thought. Kuhn sometimes called the culmination of such a change a 'conversion', a reminder that scientists too are human (Kuhn, 1962/2012, p.151).

If even in science, humanity's most rigorous endeavour, knowledge is shaped by forces beyond reason and fact, those forces are even stronger in everyday life, where the rules of evidence are less demanding. Kuhn defined paradigm shifts as changes in the collective structure of scientific knowledge, yet these structures are built by individual minds, thus, in describing how science changes, he produced a precise account of deep epistemic change, making his framework a useful map for understanding radicalisation and deradicalisation.

A paradigm is not only a set of beliefs; it is also the methods that form and sustain them. The individual therefore holds both a worldview and the epistemic pathways that built it, what is captured here by the German *Weltanschauung* rather than 'worldview': not just *what* one believes but *how*, the personal model of perception, value and meaning through which all experience is organised (Dilthey, 1883/1989). These models operate below conscious scrutiny, creating an epistemological command of how reality will be perceived: what counts as evidence, whose testimony carries authority, and what a claim must satisfy to be accepted as true (Goldman, 1979; Pritchard, 2018). It is this deeper layer, the criteria for believing rather than the radical belief itself, that gives the *Weltanschauung* its organising self-sealing power and that any account of radicalisation must engage with.

Kuhn (1962/2012) himself argued that scientific paradigms are worldviews organising reality and separating truth from falsehood, thus the mechanisms governing their formation and dissolution are not confined to changes in science, but also in people's minds.

1.2 Disentangling Paradigm, Worldview, Weltanschauung and the role of Ideology

A paradigm, in Kuhn's sense, is any structured model through which reality is perceived and interpreted, governing not only what is known but how it comes to be known. In chemistry, for example, the *what* is its objects of study (substances, metals, minerals) and the *how* is its methods (observation, experiment, and so on).

A worldview is the picture of reality a person holds, what they take to be true. A *Weltanschauung* is the individual-level equivalent of a paradigm, since it also captures not only the worldview a person holds but also the epistemic means through which they form it.

The predominant presence of ideology in radicalisation remains debated (Holbrook & Horgan, 2019), and as pointed by Koehler (2025), this is problem of lexical definition. On ideology, this paper defends its omnipresence in radicalisation, both in the wholesale adoption of a single doctrine (political or religious) but also in cases of hybrid, 'salad-bar' terrorism. Structurally, ideology is analogous to worldview and paradigm: it too is a system of interconnected beliefs and values forming a framework through which reality is perceived. What distinguishes it is its comparatively self-sealed, scrutiny-resistant character, arriving ready for consumption, neither requiring (and often not permitting) an individual's own input, with its concepts already de-pluralised, in Freeden's sense (Koehler, 2025).

Converse (1964) understood ideology, as a configuration of ideas whose elements are bound together by constraint, a functional interdependence such that a person's position on one concept predicts their stance on the others. At first sight this seems to clash with the hybrid, salad-bar style of radicalisation, since fragments drawn from incompatible sources should not cohere. Yet, the constraint is still present; it is simply built and customised by the individual rather than inherited whole. Even the hybrid radical sees their ideas and values as coherent, because they have themselves built the framework binding them. This is the ground for the paper's claim to ideology's omnipresence: what first looks like the absence of ideology is, in fact, another version of it, also constrained and sealed, only self-made. This is what composes the radicalised *Weltanschauung*, radical ideas held within an epistemic closure that

shields them from scrutiny. Understood this way, ideology is not a cause of radicalisation competing alongside grievance or belonging; it is what the individual *builds out* of grievance, belonging, and the rest.

For CVE, the abovementioned key terms exist in two dimensions: at the macro level, ideologies are collective belief structures, political/religious frameworks of meaning that radical movements display for consumption. At the micro level, however, individuals can either absorb one of these frameworks wholesale, or build their own 'mini-ideology', assembling their own from fragments across several (hybridisation). In either case, the result is always a personally constructed worldview, a *Weltanschauung* shaped by the life and biography behind it.

1.3 Biographical Salience Map of Worldview Formation

On the account above, much of the social factors vs. ideology debate loses its force: whether collectively supplied or privately built (as in many lone-actor cases), ideology becomes the framework that each person constructs and weights for themselves. Social pressures and motivation do not sit outside this framework but within it, since they too are absorbed into the individual's own working model, shaping what they hold important and how far they will go to act on it.

CVE has identified many risk factors for radicalisation, and with the evidence for most being mixed, the explanation as to why people exposed to identical conditions diverge so dramatically in their outcomes (the multifinality problem) remains open (Wolfowicz et al., 2021; Corner et al., 2019).


The Biographical Salience Map below attempts to shed some light on this. Salience, originally a neuroscience term for how strongly a stimulus stands out in the perceptual field, was taken up by psychology to capture something individual – what becomes prominent in a person's perceptual field is configured by their previous experiences and what their history, goals and concerns keep readily available to attention (Higgins, 1996).

The map, currently being operationalised into a future structured practitioner instrument, shows that each radicalised individual's biography will mark certain life domains (religion, identity, education, etc) making these more prominent, *highly-salient* in their perception. The difference in outcomes occurs then because of meaning attributed to these

domains through their personal constructs (Kelly, 1955). Kelly argued that people make sense of reality through these bipolar contrasts drawn from experience such as 'safe/dangerous', 'nurtured/neglected' and Winter and Feixas (2019) applied his theory to radicalisation with empirical support.

Thus, whilst salience determines what stands out in a person's perceptual field, it is the personal constructs giving it meaning that account for identical conditions and life experiences producing different worldviews. Grievance and violent activism are the response from someone's perceived oppressed status whilst for another, it is education and philanthropy. Taken together, salience and personal constructs offer a way to map how any given worldview was assembled, domain by domain, contrast by contrast.

Figure 1. Biographical Salience Map



Radical movements supply ready-made contrasts (believer/non-believer, oppressor/oppressed, sacred/corrupt), amplifying what biographical elements (cultural identity; injustice or the search for meaning, etc) were already charged for the individual. "Our pre-radicalization happened because of trauma, because of abuse, because of alienation, or loneliness, or social awkwardness [...] The ideology then becomes a suit of armour, it gives us a reason then to blame somebody else for the pain." (Picciolini, cited in Amanpour, 2019).

In Picciolini's account, trauma, abuse and alienation are the salient domains; ideology arrives last, as a superordinate framework that organises the charged constructs they generate into a single narrative of cause and blame.

1.4 Perception Filters: Schemas and Theory-Ladenness of Observation

A young man who sees the police as enemies does not weigh each encounter with an officer on its merits, but feels hostility before the encounter occurs.

The structure causing this is a *schema*: a mental framework through which all experience is filtered (Bartlett, 1932). The same mechanism exists in science, where the term *theory-ladenness of observation* was coined to highlight that perception is always shaped by previous belief (Hanson, 1958). Thus, just as the scientific method cannot operate without presuppositions built on prior ideas (Ladyman, 2002, p. 110), human beings in general also heavily rely on established schemas to navigate the world.

This process was identified by a deradicalisation practitioner noting that ‘formers’ (disengaged or deradicalised individuals) retain “a lingering worldview as the framework through which they interpret everything” (Meredith & Horgan, 2024, p.180). Instead of absorbing experiences for what they are, schemas reconfigure incoming experience to fit an existing worldview as a natural human tendency.

Arno Michaelis (2012, p.111), a former white supremacist movement leader turned peace activist, reflects: “My past is a demonstration of the human ability to frame reality [...] All of the information a person uses to make decisions and react to events is viewed through that lens. I've proven that one can frame reality to suit the voracious appetite of fear and hate.”


Belief shaping perception is a well established fact, but how deeply they do so becomes the question. In science, Kuhn (2012) argued paradigms determine not only what is taken as true, but what scientists can even perceive at all. For CVE research, this carries a hard implication. If a *Weltanschauung* shapes not only how a person interprets reality but what they are able to notice in the first place, then counter-narrative approaches to deradicalisation are destined to fail, even when the person engages willingly, because new evidence never registers as true from inside the worldview (Carthy et al., 2020).

2. Normal Science: The Stable Radical Worldview

Once an individual's *Weltanschauung* is understood as a personal paradigm, the logic Kuhn identified in scientific revolutions becomes a useful map for how radical worldviews form, consolidate and dissolve. The sections that follow apply Kuhn's (Kuhn, 1962/2012) sequence of paradigm shifts to the individual minds, beginning with *normal science*: the stable, self-reinforcing phase in which a consolidated paradigm operates unchallenged, its foundational commitments treated as 'beyond question' and all experience read through its own logic.

In radicalisation, this is the already-formed worldview in self-sustaining operation, where narratives seem cohesive and accounts of self and world feel congruent. At its centre lies a set of foundational commitments so deeply held that the entire epistemic architecture is organised around their protection.

Figure 2. Sequence of paradigm shifts in science applied to radical worldview dissolution



This pattern of change through disruption is not unique to science, having been widely identified in transpersonal psychology and more specifically in the study of post-traumatic growth (PTG) (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004). PTG describes the process of positive change that can follow a struggle with major life adversity, establishing that cognitive frameworks must

collapse before genuine reconstruction can begin. Religious studies reached the same logic through a similar sequential model of conversion: crisis, quest, encounter, commitment and transformation (Rambo, 1993). It isn't a coincidence that three fields as distinct as science, trauma and religion converge on the same architecture of belief change, but an indication that it reflects something fundamental about how deep commitment forms and dissolves.

2.1 The Hard Core: The Irrefutable Centre

For the jihadist, the conviction that the West is at war with Islam, or for the white nationalist, that the white race faces extinction, are not claims to be tested against evidence; but the core position everything else is built to defend.

Philosopher of science Lakatos (1978) called this the *hard core*: the irrefutable central beliefs of a doctrine, shielded from disconfirmation by a surrounding belt of more disposable, auxiliary claims. Being a collection of beliefs and epistemological commitments determining how evidence is judged and who counts as authority, the *hard core* is the central component of a *research programme*: a structured hierarchy of commitments organised around core beliefs (Lakatos, 1978).

In radicalisation, ideologies (personal or shared) operate just as research programmes and the hard cores, their non-negotiable centre – the foundational commitments around which the entire ideological architecture is organised. Conspiracism, for instance, shows this in the belief that reality hides sinister forces behind a smokescreen, whether attributed to Jews, Freemasons, the Vatican or global elites, operating as a meta-level framework governing how incoming information is processed (Hofstadter, 1964). Within conspiracies, disconfirming evidence actually strengthens conviction instead of weakening it, since direct refutation reads as further proof of the conspiracy's reach.

This resistance to revision is not peculiar to conspiracism. Bartlett (1932) showed that the mind naturally reshapes incoming experience to fit existing frameworks rather than revising them, a finding schema theory later formalised as a general feature of human cognition (Rumelhart, 1980). The *hard core* is, therefore, an entrenched cognitive default as much as an ideological commitment, which is what makes it so resistant to intervention.

This means that interventions aiming at the hard core will rarely produce genuine change, as the CVE field has already suggested (Koehler, 2025; Bélanger et al. 2020) because it is built to resist challenge without absorbing it. Lessing (1997, p.63), a Nobel laureate and former communist party member, captures this phenomenology: "To leave the Party was to give up the greater truth". Through a practitioner's eyes, radicalisation is akin to "being trained in a way of thinking, responding and automatically reacting" (Meredith & Horgan, 2024, p.180). These accounts illustrate how a radicalised worldview becomes the only lens through which a person operates, which is why deradicalisation must engage how beliefs are formed and not necessarily what they consist of.

2.2 Social Identity: The Paradigm as Community

However, a paradigm does not consolidate through ideas alone. Social identity (Tajfel and Turner, 1979) – part of self-concept that is drawn from group membership – generates internal pressure to conform to a group's beliefs, values and behaviour, with belonging and belief reinforcing each other. Within the radical group, the worldview consolidates as much through membership as through ideology: to belong is to believe, and to believe is to belong. For Michaelis (2012, p.86), his paradigm had standardised appearance, behaviour and cognition alike: "I was so accustomed to not only uniform dress of shaven heads, boots and flight jackets, but also uniform skin color, mindset, and actions". Nawaz (2012, p.47) describes: "It helped me push my identity away from being British or Pakistani, and toward defining myself as exclusively politically Muslim." When membership becomes central enough in someone's paradigm, it reorganises the very architecture of identity and self-perception.

Lofland and Stark's (1965) sequential model on the sociology of religious conversion showed that ideological commitment deepens through strengthening affective bonds rather than persuasion alone, exposing the ideology-versus-social-bonds debate as a false dichotomy: belonging and belief deepen each other until the distinction between them dissolves. Nawaz (2012, p.101) recounts: "...believing so passionately in the group that I would do anything the leadership told me would further our work. I had left my studies behind because of how blindly committed I was."

This collapse of the boundary between personal and social self or *identity fusion* (Swann et al., 2012), is often the visceral sense of oneness with a group driving extreme pro-group action in the form of terrorism. The driver behind the act of terror is still situated at the epistemic level as the group and its worldview fuse into a single structure of belief. Former neo-Nazi Meeink recounts: "The more proof I uncovered, the harder I believed. And the harder I believed, the more I wanted to follow the skinheads into battle" (Meeink & Roy, 2010, p.55).

Kuhn (1962/2012) observed that social embeddedness enforces epistemic conformity well beyond radical milieus. It persists even when personal judgment has begun to diverge from collective belief, operating through the individual's own need for belonging in spite of the presence of newly gained discernment. "I knew that the whole thing was nuts but couldn't intervene to stop it [...] On the other hand, I believed, as much as anyone else, perhaps more so, in the need to harden ourselves through group criticism" recounts Rudd (2009, p.162), former SDS and Weather Underground leader. The tension between private awareness and public commitment raises one of the oldest questions in epistemology: how does a person justify what they believe (both to themselves and others), and on what grounds?

2.3 *The Need to Justify Beliefs: Evidential Warrant*

Like houses, beliefs need a solid foundation if they are to stand. What makes a belief warranted rather than merely held is one of epistemology's oldest problems, traceable to Plato's split between knowledge and mere opinion and still debated today (Pritchard, 2018). That foundation is the *evidential warrant*: the grounds on which a belief is justified. In radicalisation, the problem becomes acute, because once the paradigm has captured the standards of evidence, a belief can feel fully justified while resting purely on grounds the paradigm supplied.

Justification is rarely the neutral weighing of evidence it presents itself as. Inside a consolidated paradigm it runs in reverse, with the conclusion ready first, and the search for proof to support it following later: "We used them as a device to justify our ideology; not only while proselytizing but also during the constant internal reinforcement that racism requires." (Michaelis, 2012, p.78). This is *motivated reasoning*, where evidence is recruited to serve conclusions already held rather than weighed on its own terms. It works in two directions at

once, outward in persuading others and inward in maintaining one's own commitment, so self-persuasion and proselytising become two faces of the same circular process by which the ideological paradigm maintains itself.

Rudd (2009, p.xx), captures this circularity: "seeking to emulate the revolutionaries we admired in Cuba, China, we convinced ourselves that violence would be successful in this country." Groups often borrow epistemic authority from admired contexts, which serve as social proof for conclusions already inherited as received knowledge rather than genuine evidence, conclusions members may never have examined for themselves (Goldman, 1999; Kusch, 2002).

Run deep enough, belief stops feeling like belief and becomes certainty: "I honestly believed that the white race was facing genocide at the hands of the Jews, and hell if I was gonna let that happen! I convinced myself and many others we had no choice." (Michaelis, 2012, p.117). Having internalised the movement's testimony as authoritative, Michaelis becomes a transmitter himself, whilst the paradigm expands through individuals whose conviction is so complete that it works as a magnet for others.

The process of belief requesting manufactured evidence is further illustrated in the passage: "Well, once you believe it, the evidence will come. By July, I believed it, and suddenly everywhere I looked I found proof of everything the skinheads were teaching me." (Meeink & Roy, 2010, p.55). What looks from outside like confirmation bias is, from within, the worldview supplying its own criteria for what counts as evidence, each piece of proof deepening the conviction that sought it.

2.4 Believing Others: Testimony, Epistemic Authority and Vigilance

In radical groups, a new recruit rarely checks what he is told; he believes the older members because they are his people and they are the ones who know.

Most of what anyone believes is taken on someone else's word. In Epistemology, this is *testimony*, that, supported by the faculty of *epistemic vigilance* (Sperber et al., 2010), weighs if a source is credible and worthy of being seen as *epistemic authority*. In scholarship, for instance, scientists under the same paradigm extend mutual trust on the basis of their equal

training and commitment which supports progress but also creates resistance to external challenges (Kuhn, 1962/2012).

Radicalisation research has consistently shown that personal contact with credible movement figures is a key factor in recruitment and commitment (Sageman, 2004). Admittedly, in a world saturated with information, delegating trust to selected authorities is a cognitive necessity due to the impossibility of scrutinising every incoming claim (Ladyman, 2002). However, within the radical paradigm, this natural human tendency becomes a vulnerability as the group systematically redirects epistemic authority away from common knowledge and exclusively toward movement sources. Describing this process of epistemic capture, Picciolini (2020, p.xxx) recounts: “The more I absorbed what Martell and his crew of older skinheads told me, the easier it became to justify the violence that accompanied my new beliefs.”

Later, when the paradigm is fully internalised, the movement's testimony becomes the most trusted source, and members become epistemic authorities themselves: “I would make it my mission to make them feel the same way, and make them have the same passion that I did for my race. That was all I was about for many years.” (Michaelis, 2012, p.156). The paradigm now enjoys expansion through highly-convinced members with an urgent message albeit devoid of any independently verified evidence.

Sperber et al. (2010) brought forward the concept of *epistemic vigilance* as the cognitive capacity to evaluate the source reliability and the plausibility of their claims arguing human beings are neither gullible nor sceptical, but selectively trust others depending on context, familiarity and prior commitments. The often assumed position that all radicalised individuals are naturally easy to manipulate is mistaken, as epistemic vigilance is still present within a radical paradigm, however redirected – operating with full force against outside sources while suspended toward movement authorities. This produces a belief system that is simultaneously hyper-critical of mainstream knowledge and entirely credulous toward its own.

Often, the first cracks of trust begin to appear by the loss of credibility not in the ideology itself, but in the epistemic authority of its human carriers, once they lose their epistemic authority: “This didn't challenge my faith in Islam, or initially my belief in the

Islamist ideology, but it did make me question the capability, tactics, and strategy of these figures.” (Nawaz, 2012, p.182).

3. Anomaly Accumulation: Defending the Paradigm

3.1 The Paradigm Against Itself: Anomalies

“... discovery commences with the awareness of anomaly” (Kuhn, 1962/2012, p.53).

An anomaly is a fact that does not fit, something a worldview cannot explain away. A white nationalist who believes his race to be superior, then meets an immigrant plainly kinder and more capable than himself, faces such an anomaly: the fact and the worldview cannot both stand. Kuhn observed that paradigm shifts begin when a committed believer can no longer ignore what the framework fails to explain.

Kuhn's (1962/2012) central claim was that change happens when the build-up of such anomalies and subsequent mounting pressure overturns the dominant model. The same applies to human minds – worldviews rarely collapse under a single decisive counterargument but through the accumulation of epistemic tensions over time. Kuhn saw anomalies as the seeds of a paradigm's undoing, yet where normal science engages anomalies as puzzles to be solved, the radical worldview suppresses them as threats. This is why the pressure of counter-evidence that drives scientific revolution is so much harder to build in radical worldview, and why, when it comes, the process rarely runs a rational or linear course.

Radical paradigms intrinsically carry their own tensions, and the doctrine can be stretched until it justifies anything, exposing it as unfalsifiable: “I had seen how Islam could be abused to justify almost any political position, including torture.” (Nawaz, 2012, p.203). Anomalies can also arise from direct personal experience, not only ideological contradiction. Picciolini (2017) recalls a gay couple approaching with their son: “...it was undeniable to me that they loved their son in the same profound ways I loved mine. Suddenly, I couldn't rationalise or justify the prejudice I had in my head”.

3.2 *Assimilation vs Accommodation*

Piaget (1952) distinguished *assimilation* (bending new experience to fit an existing framework) from *accommodation* (revising the framework to fit the experience), suggesting people reach for the first far more often. Research on adult memory showed this tendency persists well beyond childhood (Bartlett, 1932). Familiar with Piaget, Kuhn (1962/2012) recognised the same conservatism in science, describing scientific discovery as a process of conceptual assimilation. In the radical worldview, it is what lets anomalies be absorbed long before they register as contradictions.

Nawaz (2012, p.192) describes the moment *assimilation* begins to fail: "...as I started to decouple justice from Islamism in my mind, it was the beginning of the end of my belief in Islamism". In the eyes of the individual, when foundational elements of a paradigm reveal themselves as contradictory, the clash generates an internal anomaly that cannot be absorbed. He continues: "I began trying to find a way to accommodate my changing views [...] the way forward was to hone my arguments and convince other members to come around to my revised position." (Nawaz, 2012, p.202). With growing doubt, people may feel more compelled towards accommodation and revision, adjusting the paradigm from within, rather than leaving it entirely. In this scenario, the assimilative impulse still dominates as accommodation begins but does not easily break free from the framework it tries to save. The Greeks had a myth for this in Procrustes, the innkeeper who stretched or cut his guests' limbs to fit the bed. A worldview that bends all experience to match its framework does the same, with the same indifference to what is lost in the fitting.

3.3 *The Protective Belt: Defending the Hard Core*

Philosopher of science Imre Lakatos (1978) brought forward the concepts of *protective belt* and *hard core* to explain the process of shock and absorption within a paradigm. When reality contradicts belief, the believer often reaches for reasons to keep it intact: claiming attacks are false flags, defectors were always traitors, and failure was external sabotage. These rationalisations (through the process of assimilation) constitute the *protective belt* of a paradigm – the layer of disposable, auxiliary explanations that can be bent to absorb disconfirming evidence preventing damage to the framework's central beliefs. These central beliefs, in turn, form the *hard core* (the pillars of a paradigm), and the

protective belt's function is to redirect disconfirming evidence away from the hard core, attributing contradictions to external forces rather than to the paradigm itself.

Popper (1959) held that all theories resist falsification to some degree, but radicalised frameworks go further, absorbing counterevidence as confirmation rather than registering it as challenge. This is why substantial counterevidence can pile up without ever destabilising the hard core. Michaelis (2012, p.83) captures this mechanism: "I never analyzed the idea in too much depth, because doing so exposed not just one, but a host of fatal flaws".

Nawaz (2012, p.68) shows how a protective belt can be deliberately built through training: "...we were more aggressive in argument. Nasim had taught us to come back at our opponents. I'd learned the answers to their questions and would fire back a response to whatever accusations they made. That's a powerful thing to do when you're debating in front of a crowd. It makes you strong and your ideas coherent." Counter-arguments are then rehearsed, redirecting challenges away from the hard core before it registers as an anomaly to the members of a group. Lifton (1961) called this process the *thought-terminating cliché*, ready-made formulas that foreclose engagement with an idea, rejecting inquiry and adopting rhetorical fluency as strategy.

Lakatos (1978) also characterised *resistance to refutation* as a belief's capacity to withstand evidence that should count against it. Meeink & Roy (2010, p. 222) describe this process inside a radical paradigm: "Not even DNA evidence could dislodge my hatred of the Jews. I hadn't been taught that Jews were an inferior, subhuman species; I'd been taught Jews were pure evil". Here, the need to avoid doubt grows so entrenched that it overrides other commitments, even the value of truth, as Ali (2016), a former jihadist, admits: "I endlessly told others to accept the truth, but I failed to give doubt its rightful place".

The protective belt operates as much through collective reinforcement as through individual rationalisation: "We were by now a classic cult, true believers surrounded by a hostile world that we rejected and that rejected us in return. We had a holy faith, revolution, which could not be shaken. The more people left... the more our resolve was strengthened" (Rudd, 2009, p.184). Here, rather than registering as evidence against the ideology, each defection was absorbed as confirmation of the paradigm's narrative before it could reach the *hard core* of its beliefs.

This is precisely what Festinger et al. (1956) observed when infiltrating a doomsday cult whose prophecy failed to materialise. Rather than abandoning their beliefs, members intensified them, recruiting new followers with renewed urgency. Belief intensification rather than revision is the characteristic response to disconfirmation when social embeddedness within a committed group remains intact.

3.4 Epistemic Insularity: The Self-Sealing Worldview

Plato's allegory of the cave describes prisoners who, having spent their lives seeing only shadows on a wall, mistake the shadows for reality, and refuse to believe the one prisoner who escaped, saw the world for what it is, and returns to tell them. Radical worldviews operate under the same logic. "When you limit yourself to talking only to your own little Nazi cult for 7 years, then maneuver a complete 180 degree turn, it's like discovering the world all over again. For 7 years I hadn't sat down and had a conversation with anyone who wasn't white." (Michaelis, 2012, p.93). The prisoner stepping out of Plato's cave found the sunlight blinding, so did Michaelis.

Epistemic insularity occurs when a person's informational and social environment is restricted to sources reinforcing their existing worldview, sealing them off from diverse perspectives through echo chambers and epistemic bubbles (Nguyen, 2020).

Epistemic insularity in radical paradigms operates in an insidious way, as the filtering often becomes self-administered, hardening into a voluntary habit of self-censoring. The same pattern shows at the level of psychological traits of cognitive rigidity and low tolerance of ambiguity. These have also been shown to predict extremist attitudes, offering an empirical correlate for epistemic insularity (Zmigrod, Rentfrow, & Robbins, 2019).

Insularity begins by restructuring social reality around a totalising boundary, as described by Nawaz (2012, p.57): "The dividing line did not fall between ethnicities or nationalities: it was about Islam versus everyone else. That involved a recalibration of one's identity to start defining oneself as Muslim against the rest of the world." Once that boundary is in place, every social relation will be read through an in-group/out-group lens, and external sources lose epistemic standing.

Michaelis (2012, p.27) recounts shutting down his own social and informational world: "I would go back to my blinders and close my world off, limiting my experience to

pro-whites only, and input to racist information only." He had become his own gatekeeper, protecting the ideological *hard core* from anomalies that ordinary human contact would generate.

4. Crisis: Pressure Towards Belief Revision

4.1 Doxastic Commitment: Duty to belief

When a young man declares the West is at war with Islam, he binds himself to the idea, becoming answerable for whatever action that requires.

Brandom (1994) called this doxastic (pertaining to belief) commitment – the responsibility one assumes by endorsing a belief as true. Brandom distinguishes this process from *practical commitment*, or the commitment to act in order *to make* a belief true. In CVE, this distinction marks the threshold between holding a radical belief and being ready to act on it, the moment at which ideology becomes operational. A person may be *doxastically committed* to a great deal (solely in the realm of belief); but it is only when *practical commitment* is added that it becomes a basis for action.

The hold of duty to belief is emotional as much as intellectual: "Losing faith in communism is exactly paralleled by people in love who cannot let their dream of love go" (Lessing, 1997, p.191). Ideological attachment runs on the same emotional logic of romantic bonding, and, to let go, what has to be surrendered is a whole way of being in the world, explaining why commitment endures long after the accumulation of anomalies becomes undeniable.

As commitment deepens, the believer progressively surrenders their sovereignty: "I swore an oath of allegiance to God, the Qur'an, and to obey and follow the instructions of the group's leader, or amir. I promised to represent the ideology at all costs, and to be prepared to make sacrifices for the cause." (Nawaz, 2012, p.90). Belief then becomes a formal obligation carrying moral and social weight, something owed to self and others. The furthest expression of this *duty to belief* is the origin of acts of terror: "I came to live — and was prepared to die — to counter what I saw as American hegemony on a global scale." (Nawaz, 2012, p.xix). Once commitment reaches this depth, deradicalisation does not involve simply revising

beliefs, but dismantling an entire framework of meaning and identity involving primarily the ways in which that framework was built.

4.2 Cognitive Dissonance: The Struggle of Contradiction

A person can carry a belief and its contradiction for only so long. Festinger (1957) called it cognitive dissonance: the discomfort of holding two conflicting beliefs at once, and the pressure it creates to resolve them. A skinhead who builds his identity on racial hatred, yet finds himself liking the Black co-worker the creed says he should despise, feels that strain directly. Michaelis (2012, p.27) captures how dissonance can be sustained indefinitely without resolution: "Did I always know in the back of my mind, at the bottom of my heart, that I was wrong? Or did I truly believe in racial holy war? How about a little of both?" Radical beliefs can be held between conviction and suppressed doubt, held together by the social and identity structures of the movement, demonstrating that doubt and commitment can coexist, sometimes for years, without either resolving the other.

In a general sense, people prefer information confirming what they already hold over information that challenges it, because it avoids the cost of confronting frameworks they depend on (Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Nickerson, 1998). The mind defers that confrontation for as long as it can, which is why anomalies accumulate slowly, and why crisis, when it finally arrives, tends to be an internally revolutionary process: "Like an onion, you have to continue to peel back each layer and expose the next one, no matter how painful that process may be. My disillusionment with HT leaders and their tactics meant I was ready for some serious thinking about my ideology" Nawaz (2012, p.182). In radical belief change, each layer of disillusionment represents an anomaly the framework cannot accommodate until their cumulative weight generates a crisis in which genuine ideological revision becomes possible.

A cumulative loss of conviction is what the CVE field identifies as a disengagement factor in its own right, loss of faith, or the erosion of conviction in the ideology's own claims (Altier et al., 2017). On the present account, loss of faith is the surface expression of a longer process of dissonance accumulating past the point where it can be absorbed, until the discomfort itself becomes a destabilising force pushing towards crisis.

The moment the containment fails is captured in Nawaz's (2012, p.199) address to London: "Why do you confuse me so, beating me with one hand while drying my tears with

the other? How I tried for thirteen years to rip you out of my soul, to deny you, to bury you, but how I've longed for you to claim me from the hell that I just returned from." Here, two irreconcilable evaluations of the same object (London as colonial oppressor and as home) are held simultaneously, and when the worldview can no longer hold them together, they move from a simple background tension into awareness and psychological destabilisation.

What follows is the phenomenological core of cognitive dissonance at crisis point: "I've got a lot of conflicting feelings, I have a lot of shame and dislike for myself, can't put the past in the past. It's hard to look at yourself and ask, was I wrong or has the world gone crazy?" (Michaelis, 2012, p.119). Whilst the paradigm began to collapse, no alternative framework has yet been formed, leaving the individual suspended in the most precarious position of uncertainty.

For Kuhn (1962/2012), however, crisis alone is insufficient to produce revolution: a paradigm is abandoned only when a viable alternative becomes available to replace it. The destabilising force of dissonance is, therefore, a precondition to any genuine deradicalisation, albeit not a guarantee of it.

4.3 Incommensurability: Why Dialogue Fails

A counsellor and a radicalised individual can discuss freedom, justice or truth whilst these words mean entirely different things to them, so that the more they talk the less they understand each other.

For someone who has been ideologically captured, each word has been narrowed to a single fixed sense, stripped of the plural meanings it carries in ordinary use, what Koehler (2025) calls the *depluralisation* of a concept. When the two sides' concepts have been narrowed in incompatible ways, the effect approaches what Kuhn (1962/2012) called incommensurability, the gap between two frameworks with no shared standard to translate between them. "Two men who perceive the same situation differently but nevertheless employ the same vocabulary in its discussion must be using words differently. They speak, that is, from what I have called *incommensurable* viewpoints." (Kuhn, 1962/2012, p.200).

Kuhn argued that competing paradigms are not simply different interpretations of reality but entirely different worlds in which what counts as evidence is defined from within the framework itself, leaving no neutral ground in which competing claims can be fairly adjudicated. Applied to radicalisation, incommensurability explains that direct counter-narrative and confrontation-style dialogue frequently fail because no shared epistemic ground exists through which competing claims can be evaluated.


This dynamic is revealed in Nawaz's (2012, p.184) encounter with Amnesty International in prison: "It was the unconditional nature of Amnesty's support that humbled me: *'you're a human being, so you deserve our support.'* There was something very powerful and very pure about that premise. Like many ideologies, Islamism derives part of its power from its dehumanization of 'the other'". By the logic of incommensurability, a framework of unconditional human worth and the radical paradigm's logic of dehumanisation share no common epistemic ground — yet Nawaz could not filter out its source as untrustworthy, because of his direct experience of being supported by the individuals he was taught to oppose.

A deradicalisation practitioner further claimed: "If you've subscribed to a very black-and-white view of things for a very long time, and then you're kind of attempting to learn the gray, that can be confusing, right?" (Meredith & Horgan, 2024, p.192). The difficulty in holding ambiguity, itself associated with extremist attitudes (Zmigrod, 2020), can begin to be counteracted by what virtue epistemologists call *intellectual humility* (Zagzebski, 1996): the disposition to recognise limits and potential fallibility of one's beliefs. The cultivation of intellectual humility allows the first genuine opening toward worldview revision, here observed in Ali's (2016) account: "I opened my eyes. I began to dare to face the truth. To think. To face the hard questions. I got in touch with my soul".

5. Mind Revolution: The Gestalt Switch or AHA Moment

5.1 The Gestalt Switch: When Worldviews Break

One stares at the duck until, all at once, it becomes a rabbit. The drawing is the same, but one's perception is not.



A *Gestalt Switch* is how a worldview finally gives way, through an abrupt reorganisation in which the same facts suddenly mean something new. Kuhn (1962/2012, p.111) drew on this concept deliberately, finding in Gestalt's perceptual reorganisation a precise analogy for paradigm revolution: "What were ducks in the scientist's world before the revolution are rabbits afterwards". He observed that although anomalies accumulate slowly, the paradigm change they trigger comes as a sudden leap because competing frameworks are too incommensurable for any smooth transition to occur between them.

At the individual level, this *Gestaltian shift* is precisely what occurs in deradicalisation: "I noticed the beauty of an Asian eye. Of African lips. Of a Semitic nose. Traits that used to brand targets now smiled at me. With me." (Michaelis, 2012, p. 87). The same sensory input the radical paradigm once codes as threatening can also produce a wholly different perception, in which the same world is seen through different eyes.

However, the clarity that follows can be disorienting: "We were part of some kind of social psychosis or mass self-hypnosis... people must say, but how could you believe... whatever it was?" (Lessing 1997, p.53). From the other side, the former worldview becomes bewildering, with the gestalt switch leaving the old epistemic world feeling wrong and even unrecognisable, as though it had belonged to someone else.

5.2 The Disorienting Dilemma: Transformative Learning

Epistemologists Quine and Ullian (1978) described the *web of belief* as a process in which beliefs are so interconnected that revising a central one sends ripples through all schemas organised around it. From a psychology perspective, Mezirow (1991) arrived at a similar understanding, calling it a *disorienting dilemma*: an experience so at odds with existing frameworks that it cannot simply be assimilated, prompting the creation of a new framework of meaning through exploration of new perspectives and critical reflection.

Nawaz (2012, p.189) recounts: "Reading classic English literature did for me what studying Islamic theology couldn't; it forced my mind to grapple with moral dilemmas." Here, moral complexity is chosen and self-administered, generating a welcomed friction that produced real frame-of-reference revision.

The cost of an individual's *Weltanschauung* transformation is not only cognitive, but personal because a worldview does not dissolve without taking the self with it. Former Kate, reflecting on her exit, recalls: "I spent a long time wondering who I was [...] I feel like my whole worldview was shaken." (Meredith & Horgan, 2024, p.192). The epistemic and the personal dimensions are entangled in this process, meaning that their unravelling needs more than cognitive support.

5.3 The Case for Epistemic Pluralism: Feyerabend and the Conditions for Revolution

"The only principle that does not inhibit progress is: anything goes." (Feyerabend, 1975, p.28).

This is Feyerabend's *epistemic pluralism*, the precondition for any genuine intellectual revolution. A sparring partner of Kuhn, Feyerabend asked what makes intellectual revolutions possible. His answer, developed in *Against Method* (1975), was *proliferation*, meaning that science advances by holding many rival theories in play at once, since what holds it back from progress is a single framework blinding inquiry to external evidence. Pluralism, in its turn is the end process of proliferation, when a framework has been stripped of its perceptual and methodological blinkers. The slogan 'anything goes' is widely misread as a licence for chaos, but Feyerabend meant the opposite. For him, *epistemological anarchism* meant the refusal to subordinate inquiry to any single authoritative method, a critique of epistemic authoritarianism and monocultures rather than a slide into relativism.

The radicalisation process in itself is the adoption of an *epistemic monoculture*: a sealed framework that forecloses competing perspectives and treats diversity of thought as a threat. Its danger is exactly the one Feyerabend identified in single-theory science, that the framework rejects the evidence a rival one would reveal. With this, in deradicalisation,

proliferation of beliefs and reasons for believing is the condition for revolution, with worldview revision requiring sustained exposure to frameworks first felt as incommensurable.

Nawaz (2012, p.181) describes his prison time: "The studies, conversations, and experiences I gained in Mazrah Tora, over months and years, were crucial in overcoming my dogmatic allegiance to the Islamist ideology. Having entered prison as an extremely idealistic twenty-four-year-old, full of rage against society, and having nothing else to do but study over the course of four years, I came to reevaluate everything I stood for." Prison had imposed epistemic plurality, bypassing the paradigm's filters and forcing engagement with frameworks he could not screen out. Demonstrating proliferation in practice, he recounts a simultaneous encounter with diverse frameworks the radical paradigm had foreclosed: "That atmosphere, as one can imagine, led to a very rich conversation. And I read lots and lots of literature. I read George Orwell. I also studied traditional Islamic theology." (Nawaz, 2013).

For Michaelis (2012, p.77), the worldview dissolved through the gradual return of forbidden cultural plurality and the conscious proliferation of ideas arriving through lived experience rather than argument: "As time passed I began to allow myself more and more contact with things that were once absolutely prohibited [...] Books about subjects other than race. By the time I welcomed back the Beastie Boys into my life, it was all over".

6. Transilience and Genuine Deradicalisation

6.1 Transilience

In psychology, *transilience* has been used for the capacity to transform positively through disruption (Lozano Nasi, Jans, & Steg, 2023). Drawing on the Latin *transilire*, to 'leap across', this paper adapts the term to the epistemic register, using it to name the reconstruction of the machinery of believing that genuine deradicalisation requires.

Transilience is the reorganisation of an individual's epistemic architecture beneath a worldview, a change not only in what one believes, but in how one comes to believe, the passage from one way of forming belief to another, after which knowledge, self and world are no longer encountered on the same terms.

Nawaz recounts: "Slowly and alone, I began to unpack the last thirteen years of my indoctrination, concept by concept. Ideas that I had once held sacrosanct were unraveling in my mind, revealed as crude political deceptions. My whole character would have to change.

Every moral frame of reference that I had built up in my mind required reevaluation." (Nawaz, 2012, p.211). This is the epitome of transilience, with change reaching the core 'sacrosanct' beliefs; the frame of reference in which they were held, and his 'whole character', showing that genuine deradicalisation is a *shedding of skin*.

"The transfer of allegiance from paradigm to paradigm is a conversion experience that cannot be forced." (Kuhn, 1962/2012, p.151). Kuhn wrote this of scientists, but it reads as though written for deradicalisation practitioners. Paradigm change needs conditions that make conversion possible, it cannot be argued into place, coerced through pressure, or delivered as correct information. Transilience cannot be enforced, because its most important feature is the restoration of epistemic freedom and sovereignty, through which the individual can, perhaps for the first time, construct a *Weltanschauung* on their own terms.

Transilience also does not require full identity transformation, (though that often follows), nor the swapping of radical views for mainstream ones. "My political grievances were still there, but I saw now that we no longer required Islamism in order to campaign against them. Islamism itself had in fact become one of the grievances that needed challenging." (Nawaz, 2012, p.211). This is no redemption narrative in which the former becomes a model citizen with no trace of his old self; his grievances remain. What changes is the epistemic infrastructure through which they are processed and acted on, the same biographical salience, life domains and personal constructs, now held within a framework that can tolerate complexity without needing ideology to resolve it. When that architecture shifts, what once sounded like the solution becomes part of the problem.

Post-traumatic growth (PTG) research lends transilience independent support: profound transformation requiring the collapse of an existing framework before reconstruction can begin (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004). How traumatic that collapse becomes depends on the individual's own resources, support and surrounding conditions. What PTG adds, and what the deradicalisation field has been slower to register, is that reconstruction after collapse can produce a more robust, self-authored and autonomous orientation than existed before. This is where recidivism to further radicalisation could potentially be at its lowest, because an individual's level of evidence scrutiny has been sharpened. Transilience, at its fullest, is the possibility of a more examined life rather than a loss. "I reflect on who I used

to be and the transformation I've gone through to become a person who lives in spite of strife instead of for it." (Michaelis, 2012, p.111).

6.2 Genuine Deradicalisation versus Behavioural Disengagement

Horgan (2009) distinguished between behavioural disengagement and genuine deradicalisation: a person may stop the violence while the underlying framework stays wholly intact, producing compliance without transformation. The individual requires not only a new worldview to inhabit, but an entirely new set of epistemic operating mechanisms through which that worldview will be constructed, evaluated and sustained — which is why genuine deradicalisation is so rarely swift, and why reconstructing what one believes and reconstructing how one comes to believe are two distinct and equally demanding processes.

Renunciation of violence is therefore necessary, but not sufficient. As Nawaz puts it, "No one really deserves a thank-you for promising not to randomly kill you [...] I needed to question the very basis of the ideology itself." (Nawaz, 2012, p.211). What deradicalisation demands beyond disengagement is the moment the individual turns on the epistemic infrastructure itself and begins to interrogate it.

Nawaz (2012, p.181) shows the temporal depth this took for him: "Although I'd started this process by the time I left prison, I would return to the UK still a member of HT [...] That's five years to overturn the ideological convictions that had defined me for over a decade." The epistemic shift began in prison, behavioural disengagement followed a year later, and full ideological revision took five years more, consistent with Lakatos's (1978) prediction that the hard core outlasts the collapse of group membership and auxiliary commitments long after the protective belt has begun to fail. Genuine deradicalisation is a sustained process of revision in which the hard core is the last thing to go, and when it finally goes, what occurs is the gestalt switch earlier described.

A final passage captures what this demands: "I desperately needed the space to learn who I was, to construct myself anew, piece by piece." (Nawaz, 2012, p.207). Paradigm dissolution does not liberate so much as leave a self that must be rebuilt from the ground up. Lasting deradicalisation therefore requires both the epistemic revision of belief and ways of knowing and the sustained conditions under which a new, coherent framework can gradually emerge.

7. Discussion

"I engaged in actions I thought were correct. But now I began to question how I knew what I knew" (Ali, 2016). Like Nawaz, Ali remained a Muslim; the content of his faith largely survived. What changed was the manner of holding it, how scripture was read, what evidence could be accepted, whose interpretation he deferred to. His exit was a revision of the epistemic structure beneath the beliefs rather than the exchange of one set of beliefs for another, which is why faith could remain while extremism fell away. In transience within deradicalisation, it is the criteria for truth, not the truths themselves, that have to move.

Nothing in this process requires deviant cognition. The narrowing of perception that sustains a radical worldview is ordinary human epistemics, and is present even in science, the most rigorous, self-correcting knowledge system we have. Nawaz (2012, pp.181-182) used Kuhn's vocabulary in recalling his exit, "to unpick that mindset until I questioned all my fundamental convictions was nothing less than a paradigm shift."

The framework rests on a shift in the unit of analysis. Where the field locates the drivers of radicalisation in ideology, social bonds, grievance or identity threat, this paper treats these as dimensions of one epistemic structure: a *Weltanschauung* governing not only what a person believes but the criteria through which all experience is filtered and judged. Two claims follow: radicalisation is the formation of a complete epistemic paradigm, and genuine deradicalisation requires reconstructing that infrastructure rather than swapping its contents (Horgan, 2009; Koehler & Fiebig, 2019; Cherney & Koehler, 2023). Whatever first drives someone in, lasting exit requires belief change at the level of architecture, in how belief is formed and sustained.

If ideology is what the individual builds out of grievance, belonging and the rest, then hybrid, self-assembled belief systems are an expected outcome instead of being a puzzle for the research field, even where an attacker fits no established category. The salad-bar radical still shows Converse's (1964) constraint, only self-built, so the content can vary wildly, and even contradict itself, while the self-sealing way of holding it stays constant. A person can hold plural belief contents within a single closed structure, assembling fragments from everywhere and processing them all through one architecture.

The biographical salience map (a tool under construction) accounts for multifinality (Wolfowicz et al., 2021) showing why two people in the same milieu, ideology and conditions

diverge so sharply in behaviour. Radicalisation runs through salient life domains configured differently in each person, producing different epistemic structures and degrees of commitment. Interventions aimed at a single factor predictably fail, because they address one dimension of an architecture that is multidimensional and individually configured.

The same logic exposes an iatrogenic risk in current practice. Because the radical paradigm fixes which testimony, evidence and inference count as legitimate, an intervention that ignores this meta-level can trigger the paradigm's defences and harden the very core it meant to dislodge. Bélanger et al. (2020) found counter-narratives increased support for extremist groups among high-risk individuals; Carthy et al. (2020) found sparse evidence of their effectiveness overall and Koehler and Fiebig (2019) warn that interventions built on untested assumptions risk exactly these effects. A related danger is ideological re-capture: drop the content without rebuilding the structure, and the person stays vulnerable to the next totalising framework. Durable deradicalisation requires genuine epistemic revision arrived at with enough autonomy preserved to produce real commitment rather than surface compliance.

Several established concepts describe from the outside what this framework explains from within. Identity fusion (Swann et al., 2012) and the devoted actor (Atran, 2016) capture the dissolving boundary between self and group and the readiness to sacrifice everything for sacred values; the framework adds the layer beneath both, where group and worldview fuse into one structure of belief, so that to defend the conviction is to defend the self.

Its value lies less in prescribing new practices than in explaining why the strongest ones work. The Phoenix model (Silke et al., 2021) maps the path from doubt to a new prosocial identity; this account supplies the mechanism beneath it, since that shift is, at the level of how belief is held, the reconstruction of the criteria for evidence and authority that transilience names. The Attitudes-Behaviors Corrective model (ABC) (Khalil et al., 2019) holds that belief and action can move independently, whilst the paper's framework locates the source of that independence in the epistemic architecture, which keeps attitudes in place after behaviour shifts.

The existing concept closest to this account is Koehler's (2025) depluralisation and repluralisation, built on Freeden's morphology of ideology. Freeden holds that political concepts, including core ones, are inherently contestable, and ideology works by decontesting them, fixing a single meaning at the core and shielding it with adjacent concepts. The

structure parallels Lakatos, a protected core behind a shielding layer, though the protection differs in source, arising from methodological convention for Lakatos and from the closing of contestable meaning for Freeden.

Radicalisation then involves two simultaneous narrowings: the meanings of a person's core concepts contract (semantic decontestation), and the range of perspectives and criteria for evidence they encounter contracts with them (epistemic insularity). Koehler's repluralisation reopens the first by loosening fixed meanings, whilst Feyerabend's proliferation reopens the second by returning rival ways of thinking to the individual's view. The same narrowing runs through the literature on cult exiting, where the captured individual lives in the illusion of choice inside a system that has foreclosed real alternatives (Lalich, 2004).

Koehler and Fiebig (2019) found effective programmes work across pragmatic, ideological and affective levels, engaging the whole person, and evaluations locate success in holistic, multi-year support (Spaaij et al., 2025). These accounts explain disengagement well, yet none explains change at the epistemic level. In the field's largest autobiographical study, across 87 accounts, loss of faith in the ideology was neither common nor necessary for leaving, and nearly half who left stayed committed to the worldview (Altier et al., 2017). Disengagement routinely occurs without epistemic change, which is why that change needs a separate account.

What produced genuine epistemic revision in the formers studied here was sustained, often circumstantial exposure to frameworks they could not dismiss, rather than counter-narrative or the delivery of correct information. Intervention might therefore prioritise creating the conditions for epistemic pluralism over engineering the beliefs that emerge from it. This connects to perspective-taking in CVE, though existing studies address relational or affective aspects and a different target, since the framework points toward exposing people to different ways of forming belief, rather than different beliefs. Those studies have tested non-radicalised participants (Noor & Halabi, 2018), documented diminished perspective-taking without intervening on it (Lavenne-Collot et al., 2022), or shown it preventing radicalisation rather than undoing it (Feddes et al., 2015).

Pluralism, on this account, means more than exposure. Encountering rival perspectives begins the work, but what completes it is the person practising plurality themselves, learning to give more than one reading of the same event and to reach the same fact by more than one

route, through perception, testimony or inference (Pritchard, 2018). Transilience restores this generative capacity, proliferation exercised from within, where the radical paradigm had previously permitted only one reading and one authorised route to truth.

Structural conditions are not enough; transilience also needs the dispositions that make them productive, the epistemic virtues. Chief among them is epistemic autonomy, the capacity to evaluate and revise one's beliefs through one's own reasoning rather than deference to authority (Zagzebski, 1996). Autonomy varies across individuals, and low autonomy with high deference to group authority predicts rapid, total capture, while higher autonomy may allow affiliation without full consolidation. Intellectual humility, the recognition of one's own fallibility, opens the person to different perspectives, and open-mindedness lets those perspectives register. These virtues are what the radical paradigm supplants and what reconstruction must restore. "So my plea today to everyone, especially those who sincerely believe in Islamist Jihadism: refuse dogmatic authority." (Ali, 2016). Interventions that cultivate such dispositions, rather than delivering conclusions, are the likeliest to make transilience possible.

8. Practical Applications of Transilience

The framework set out so far is deliberately theoretical due to heavily drawing on philosophy of science and epistemology to describe how a radical worldview forms and dissolves. With that said, the abstraction only earns its place if it can be clearly translated to the practical sphere, where the real work is done by boots on the ground. If this account is right, it shifts what deradicalisation work could aim at. Radicalisation takes hold at the level of how a person knows rather than only what they happen to believe, so the work of deradicalisation is to help rebuild the criteria by which they reach conclusions: what they accept as evidence, whose word they trust, and how they justify what they hold. Former extremists point to exactly this when they describe their exit, recalling which sources they came to trust and how they learned to change their minds (The Daily Former, 2024).

Seen this way, some familiar frustrations make sense. Counter-narratives and 'corrected information' tend to fail, less through poor delivery than because they aim at content, which is where the worldview is strongest. The material is absorbed as confirmation or dismissed as hostile, and a challenge aimed straight at the core beliefs, before the

surrounding structure has loosened, tends to harden them rather than shift them (Carthy et al., 2020; Bélanger et al., 2020). Koehler (2025) observes the same reflex: pressed directly through doctrinal debate, ideologies bend and then rebound. As Nawaz (2012, pp.184-185) puts it, "This is not something you can teach; it is something you must live and feel. Where the heart leads, the mind can follow." The same logic explains why hybrid, self-assembled belief systems resist content-based responses. There is no fixed doctrine to correct, only a way of holding whatever the person has assembled. Working at the level of that structure frees the practitioner from chasing content, because the structure stays constant while the content shifts.

Several existing practices already loosen the grip of a radical worldview and point toward transilience, without quite reaching it. Repluralisation restores plural political concepts (Koehler, 2017), and significance-quest rehabilitation reduces extremism by restoring personal significance through pro-social means (Webber et al., 2018). Integrative-complexity interventions come closest, by helping people see that an issue holds several legitimate positions, and that their own values can pull against one another, they build flexibility into the way a person reasons, loosening the *either-or* habit the radical worldview depends on (Liht & Savage, 2013). Each of these works on the contents of the worldview, its motivational supports, or the complexity of reasoning within it, rather than on the criteria for truth and the ways of knowing that transilience says must be rebuilt from scratch.

How that rebuilding happens follows from Feyerabend's argument rather than from any single technique as the cases here show a mechanism, not an exact template. What changed Nawaz and Michaelis was not prison or a friendship as such, but the sustained exposure to rival, incommensurable perspectives those situations happened to provide, encountered directly enough to contradict the worldview in the same emotional terms it was built on, much as a corrective emotional experience works against trauma by meeting the old expectation with its opposite (Alexander & French, 1946). The task is to create such conditions on purpose, through encounters the worldview cannot filter out, while cultivating the dispositions that let them land: epistemic autonomy, intellectual humility and open-mindedness. This has to be facilitated rather than imposed, since reconstruction that is forced produces compliance rather than the self-authored change that lasts.

In concrete terms, this means working on the activity of knowing itself: guided practice in asking how one knows what one claims to know, what would count as evidence against it, and why one source has been trusted over another. This capacity can be exercised, and with practice strengthens like a muscle, by taking a neutral situation and producing several readings of it, then several ways of testing each. Even knowing that it is raining can come by forecast, by radio, by a glance through the window, or by stepping outside and getting wet, and a person who notices and weighs these routes is already practising epistemic pluralism in miniature. The aim is to rebuild epistemic habits through use, prompted by questions rather than delivered as instruction, so that judgement is exercised rather than described. A course in epistemology would be absorbed like any other content; the point is to exercise the capacity, not teach the subject.

However, two limits apply, and practitioners will rightly press on both. The approach suits longer-term work rather than acute risk management, where behavioural containment may still be necessary and legitimate. And because change is self-directed, it carries no guaranteed outcome: self-discovery may return a person to the conclusions they started with. What the framework offers is not a protocol but a clearer account of what durable change requires, and therefore of where to put the effort.

Conclusion

Kubrick's *A Clockwork Orange* crystallises an intuition the CVE field has long carried, that disengagement and deradicalisation are different things. Harder to pin down is what that difference consists of at the level of mechanism. This paper has proposed one way of specifying it, drawing on philosophy of science for how worldviews form and dissolve, and on epistemology and psychology for the internal processes of belief change.

The account turns on a shift in the unit of analysis. Kuhn's paradigm gave the structure its sequence; Lakatos's protective belt explained its persistence; Feyerabend's pluralism identified the conditions under which it dissolves, and why a closed framework cannot see the evidence a rival paradigm would reveal. Psychology supplied the human interior: the salience that decides which life domains drive a person, the personal constructs that give them meaning, the duty to belief that embeds it so deeply that revision means dismantling it rather than updating it, and the gestalt switch that captures how deep change feels from inside.

Epistemology connected the two levels through testimony, authority and evidential warrant, linking the individual's inner architecture to the collective paradigm.

Together these yield a conclusion simple to state and consequential in practice. Genuine deradicalisation requires rebuilding a person's epistemic architecture: the criteria for truth, the assignment of authority, the standards of admissible evidence. Interventions that work only on belief content leave this architecture intact and, in Lakatos's terms, *strike the belt* while the *hard core holds*. Drop the beliefs without rebuilding the structure that formed them, and the person stays open to capture by the next totalising framework with enough social and narrative force.

What transilience names is the precondition for genuine exit, the restoration of the capacity to build one's own *Weltanschauung* on one's own terms. That capacity is exercised rather than received, in giving the world more than one reading and reaching truth by more than one route. It is the recovery of epistemic freedom rather than the installation of 'correct beliefs' or the endorsement of any ideology. The first-person accounts show consistently that this is a slow, disorienting and deeply personal process rather than a programmable outcome, and intervention design has been slow to absorb the difference.

This framework is a proposal, not a settled result, and its claims need testing across different ideological traditions, contexts and populations; the Biographical Salience Map needs developing into a usable instrument, and transilience needs criteria for assessment in practice. What it offers in advance is a vocabulary precise enough to make those questions askable, since a field cannot measure what it has not yet defined. Radicalisation studies have long sensed that something decisive happens at the level of how people come to believe. This paper has proposed an account of what that something is, locating radicalisation in the way belief is held rather than in its contents, and naming what it takes to loosen its grip.

References

- Alexander, F., & French, T. M. (1946). *Psychoanalytic therapy: Principles and application*. Ronald Press.
- Ali, M. (2016, April). *Inside the mind of a former radical jihadist* [Video]. TED Conferences. https://www.ted.com/talks/manwar_ali_inside_the_mind_of_a_former_radical_jihadist
- Meeink, F., & Roy, J. M. (2010). *Autobiography of a recovering skinhead: The Frank Meeink story as told to Jody M. Roy*. Hawthorne Books.
- Altier, M. B., Boyle, E. L., Shortland, N. D., & Horgan, J. G. (2017). Why they leave: An analysis of terrorist disengagement events from eighty-seven autobiographical accounts. *Security Studies*, 26(2), 305–332. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2017.1280307>
- Altier, M. B., Boyle, E. L., & Horgan, J. G. (2021). Returning to the fight: An empirical analysis of terrorist reengagement and recidivism. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 33(4), 836–860. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2019.1679781>
- Amanpour, C. (Host). (2019, March 18). Former neo-Nazi Christian Picciolini on radicalization [TV series episode]. In *Amanpour & Company*. PBS; WNET. <https://www.pbs.org/wnet/amanpour-and-company/video/former-neo-nazi-christian-picciolini-on-radicalization>
- Atran, S. (2016). The devoted actor: Unconditional commitment and intractable conflict across cultures. *Current Anthropology*, 57(S13), S192–S203. <https://doi.org/10.1086/685495>
- Bartlett, F. C. (1932). *Remembering: A study in experimental and social psychology*. Cambridge University Press.
- Bélangier, J. J., Nisa, C. F., Schumpe, B. M., Gurmu, T., Williams, M. J., & Putra, I. E. (2020). Do counter-narratives reduce support for ISIS? Yes, but not for their target audience. *Frontiers in Psychology*, 11, 1059.
- Brandom, R. B. (1994). *Making it explicit: Reasoning, representing, and discursive commitment*. Harvard University Press.
- Carthy, S. L., Doody, C. B., Cox, K., O'Hora, D., & Sarma, K. M. (2020). Counter-narratives for the prevention of violent radicalisation: A systematic review of targeted interventions. *Campbell Systematic Reviews*, 16(3), e1106. <https://doi.org/10.1002/cl2.1106>
- Cherney, A., & Koehler, D. (2023). What does sustained desistance from violent extremism entail: A proposed theory of change and policy implications. *Terrorism and Political Violence*. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2023.2215348>

Converse, P. E. (1964). The nature of belief systems in mass publics. In D. E. Apter (Ed.), *Ideology and discontent* (pp. 206–261). Free Press.

Corner, E., Bouhana, N., & Gill, P. (2019). The multifinality of vulnerability indicators in lone-actor terrorism. *Psychology, Crime & Law*, 25(2), 111–132.

Dilthey, W. (1989). *Introduction to the human sciences* (R. A. Makkreel & F. Rodi, Eds. & Trans.). Princeton University Press. (Original work published 1883)

Feddes, A. R., Mann, L., & Doosje, B. (2015). Increasing self-esteem and empathy to prevent violent radicalization: A longitudinal quantitative evaluation of a resilience training focused on adolescents with a dual identity. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 45(7), 400–411. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jasp.12307>

Festinger, L., Riecken, H. W., & Schachter, S. (1956). *When prophecy fails: A social and psychological study of a modern group that predicted the destruction of the world*. University of Minnesota Press.

Festinger, L. (1957). *A theory of cognitive dissonance*. Stanford University Press.

Feyerabend, P. (1975). *Against method: Outline of an anarchistic theory of knowledge*. New Left Books.

Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (1984). *Social cognition*. Random House.

Fliegende Blätter. (1892, October 23). [Duck-rabbit illusion]. *Fliegende Blätter*, 97(2465), 147.

Goldman, A. (1979). What is justified belief? In G. S. Pappas (Ed.), *Justification and knowledge* (pp. 1–23). Reidel.

Goldman, A. (1999). *Knowledge in a social world*. Oxford University Press.

Green, E. D. (2016, May 12). What are the most-cited publications in the social sciences (according to Google Scholar)? *Impact of Social Sciences Blog*, London School of Economics. <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/impactofsocialsciences/2016/05/12/what-are-the-most-cited-publications-in-the-social-sciences-according-to-google-scholar/>

Hanson, N. R. (1958). *Patterns of discovery: An inquiry into the conceptual foundations of science*. Cambridge University Press.

Higgins, E. T. (1996). Knowledge activation: Accessibility, applicability, and salience. In E. T. Higgins & A. W. Kruglanski (Eds.), *Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles* (pp. 133–168). Guilford Press.

Hofstadter, R. (1964). The paranoid style in American politics. *Harper's Magazine*, 229, 77–86.

Holbrook, D., & Horgan, J. (2019). Terrorism and ideology: Cracking the nut. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 13(6), 2–15.

Holbrook, D. (2025). *Sacred violence: The enduring role of ideology in terrorism and radicalisation*. Commission for Countering Extremism.
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-enduring-role-of-ideology-in-terrorism-and-radicalisation>

Horgan, J. (2009). *Walking away from terrorism: Accounts of disengagement from radical and extremist movements*. Routledge.

Horgan, J., & Shayler, M. (2026). Why the 'salad bar of ideologies' does not help us understand contemporary violent extremism. *Advances in Psychology*, 1(1), e607682.
<https://doi.org/10.56296/aip00057>

Khalil, J., Horgan, J., & Zeuthen, M. (2019). The Attitudes-Behaviors Corrective (ABC) Model of Violent Extremism. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 1-26.
doi:10.1080/09546553.2019.1699793

Kelly, G. A. (1955). *The psychology of personal constructs* (Vols. 1–2). Norton.

Koehler, D. (2017). *Understanding deradicalization: Methods, tools and programs for countering violent extremism*. Routledge.

Koehler, D., & Fiebig, V. (2019). Knowing what to do: Academic and practitioner understanding of how to counter violent radicalization. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 13(3), 44–62.

Koehler, D. (2025). What's in a word? Revisiting the role of ideology in the practice of and scholarship on countering violent extremism. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 37(7), 1015–1030. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2025.2484753>

Kubrick, S. (Director). (1971). *A clockwork orange* [Film]. Warner Bros.

Kuhn, T. S. (2012). *The structure of scientific revolutions* (4th ed.). University of Chicago Press. (Original work published 1962)

Kusch, M. (2002). *Knowledge by agreement: The programme of communitarian epistemology*. Oxford University Press.

Ladyman, J. (2002). *Understanding philosophy of science*. Routledge.

Lakatos, I. (1978). *The methodology of scientific research programmes: Philosophical papers volume 1* (J. Worrall & G. Currie, Eds.). Cambridge University Press.

- Lalich, J. (2004). *Bounded choice: True believers and charismatic cults*. University of California Press.
- Lavenne-Collot, N., Dissaux, N., Campelo, N., Villalon, C., Bronsard, G., Botbol, M., & Cohen, D. (2022). Sympathy-empathy and the radicalization of young people. *Children*, 9(12), 1889. <https://doi.org/10.3390/children9121889>
- Lessing, D. (1997). *Walking in the shade: Volume two of my autobiography, 1949–1962*. HarperCollins.
- Lifton, R. J. (1961). *Thought reform and the psychology of totalism: A study of "brainwashing" in China*. W. W. Norton.
- Liht, J., & Savage, S. (2013). Preventing violent extremism through value complexity: Being Muslim Being British. *Journal of Strategic Security*, 6(4), 44–66. <https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.6.4.3>
- Lofland, J., & Stark, R. (1965). Becoming a world-saver: A theory of conversion to a deviant perspective. *American Sociological Review*, 30(6), 862–875.
- Lozano Nasi, V., Jans, L., & Steg, L. (2023). Can we do more than "bounce back"? Transilience in the face of climate change risks. *Journal of Environmental Psychology*, 86, Article 101947. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvp.2022.101947>
- Meredith, K., & Horgan, J. (2024). After they leave: Exploring post-exit distress in former violent extremists. *Journal for Deradicalization*, (38). <https://jd.journals.publicknowledgeproject.org/jd/index.php/jd/article/view/865>
- Mezirow, J. (1991). *Transformative dimensions of adult learning*. Jossey-Bass.
- Michaelis, A. (2012). *My life after hate*. Authentic Presence Publications.
- Nawaz, M. (2012). *Radical: My journey out of Islamist extremism*. WH Allen.
- Nawaz, M. (2013, June 28). *How does an Islamist extremist change his mind?* [Radio interview with G. Raz]. NPR. <https://www.npr.org/transcripts/195238189>
- Nguyen, C. T. (2020). Echo chambers and epistemic bubbles. *Episteme*, 17(2), 141–161. <https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2018.32>
- Nickerson, R. S. (1998). Confirmation bias: A ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises. *Review of General Psychology*, 2(2), 175–220.
- Noor, M., & Halabi, S. (2018). Can we forgive a militant outgroup member? The role of perspective-taking. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, 21(4), 246–255. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajsp.12328>

- Piaget, J. (1952). *The origins of intelligence in children* (M. Cook, Trans.). International Universities Press.
- Picciolini, C. (2017). *My descent into America's neo-Nazi movement — and how I got out* [TED Talk]. https://www.ted.com/talks/christian_picciolini_my_descent_into_america_s_neo_nazi_movement_and_how_i_got_out
- Picciolini, C. (2020). *Breaking hate: Confronting the new culture of extremism*. Hachette Books.
- Plato. (1941). *The republic of Plato* (F. M. Cornford, Trans.). Oxford University Press. (Original work written ca. 375 BCE).
- Popper, K. R. (1959). *The logic of scientific discovery*. Hutchinson.
- Pritchard, D. (2018). *What is this thing called knowledge?* (4th ed.). Routledge.
- Quine, W. V. O., & Ullian, J. S. (1978). *The web of belief* (2nd ed.). Random House.
- Rambo, L. R. (1993). *Understanding religious conversion*. Yale University Press.
- Richards, R. J., & Daston, L. (Eds.). (2016). *Kuhn's 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions' at fifty: Reflections on a science classic*. University of Chicago Press.
- Rudd, M. (2009). *Underground: My life with SDS and the Weathermen*. HarperCollins.
- Rumelhart, D. E. (1980). Schemata: The building blocks of cognition. In R. J. Spiro, B. C. Bruce, & W. F. Brewer (Eds.), *Theoretical issues in reading comprehension* (pp. 33–58). Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Sageman, M. (2004). *Understanding terror networks*. University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Spaaij, R., Iqbal, M., Zammit, A., Sarakibi, M., & Smith, D. (2025). An evidence-informed theory of change for facilitating disengagement from violent extremism: Insights from the Community Integration Support Program. *Journal for Deradicalization*, 43, 1–31.
- Sperber, D., Clément, F., Heintz, C., Mascaro, O., Mercier, H., Origgi, G., & Wilson, D. (2010). Epistemic vigilance. *Mind & Language*, 25(4), 359–393. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2010.01394.x>
- Silke, A., Morrison, J., Maiberg, H., Slay, C., & Stewart, R. (2021). The Phoenix model of disengagement and deradicalisation from terrorism and violent extremism. *Monatsschrift für Kriminologie und Strafrechtsreform*, 104(3), 310–320. <https://doi.org/10.1515/mks-2021-0128>

- Swann, W. B., Jr., Jetten, J., Gómez, Á., Whitehouse, H., & Bastian, B. (2012). When group membership gets personal: A theory of identity fusion. *Psychological Review*, 119(3), 441–456. <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0028589>
- Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), *The social psychology of intergroup relations* (pp. 33–47). Brooks/Cole.
- Tedeschi, R. G., & Calhoun, L. G. (2004). Posttraumatic growth: Conceptual foundations and empirical evidence. *Psychological Inquiry*, 15(1), 1–18.
- The Daily Former. (2024, January 3). How to navigate what you stand for. In *The Daily Former*. Spotify. <https://open.spotify.com/episode/2rUzXrkJASm25pcaVR4ySj>
- Webber, D., Chernikova, M., Kruglanski, A. W., Gelfand, M. J., Hettiarachchi, M., Gunaratna, R., Lafrenière, M.-A., & Bélanger, J. J. (2018). Deradicalizing detained terrorists. *Political Psychology*, 39(3), 539–556. <https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12428>
- Winter, D. A., & Feixas, G. (2019). Toward a constructivist model of radicalization and deradicalization: A conceptual and methodological proposal. *Frontiers in Psychology*, 10, 412. <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.00412>
- Wolfowicz, M., Litmanovitz, Y., Weisburd, D., & Hasisi, B. (2021). Cognitive and behavioral radicalization: A systematic review of the putative risk and protective factors. *Campbell Systematic Reviews*, 17(3), e1174. <https://doi.org/10.1002/cl2.1174>
- Zagzebski, L. (1996). *Virtues of the mind: An inquiry into the nature of virtue and the ethical foundations of knowledge*. Cambridge University Press.
- Zmigrod, L., Rentfrow, P. J., & Robbins, T. W. (2019). Cognitive inflexibility predicts extremist attitudes. *Frontiers in Psychology*, 10, 989. <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.00989>
- Zmigrod, L. (2020). The role of cognitive rigidity in political ideologies: Theory, evidence, and future directions. *Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences*, 34, 34–39. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cobeha.2019.10.016>

About the JD Journal for Deradicalization

The JD Journal for Deradicalization is the world's only peer reviewed periodical for the theory and practice of deradicalization with a wide international audience. Named an ["essential journal of our times"](#) (Cheryl LaGuardia, Harvard University) the JD's editorial board of expert advisors includes some of the most renowned scholars in the field of deradicalization studies, such as Prof. Dr. John G. Horgan (Georgia State University); Prof. Dr. Tore Bjørgo (Norwegian Police University College); Prof. Dr. Mark Dechesne (Leiden University); Prof. Dr. Cynthia Miller-Idriss (American University Washington D.C.); Prof. Dr. Julie Chernov Hwang (Goucher College); Prof. Dr. Marco Lombardi, (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore Milano); Dr. Paul Jackson (University of Northampton); Professor Michael Freeden, (University of Nottingham); Professor Hamed El-Sa'id (Manchester Metropolitan University); Prof. Sadeq Rahimi (University of Saskatchewan, Harvard Medical School), Dr. Omar Ashour (University of Exeter), Prof. Neil Ferguson (Liverpool Hope University), Prof. Sarah Marsden (Lancaster University), Prof. Maura Conway (Dublin City University), Dr. Kurt Braddock (American University Washington D.C.), Dr. Michael J. Williams (The Science of P/CVE), Dr. Mary Beth Altier (New York University) and Dr. Aaron Y. Zelin (Washington Institute for Near East Policy), Prof. Dr. Adrian Cherney (University of Queensland), Dr. Wesley S. McCann (RTI International), and Dr. Daren Fisher (Hampton University), Prof. Dr. Maria Moulin-Stożek (Jan Długosz University).

For more information please see: www.journal-derad.com

Twitter: @JD_JournalDerad

Facebook: www.facebook.com/deradicalisation

The JD Journal for Deradicalization is a proud member of the Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ).

ISSN: 2363-9849

Editor in Chief: Daniel Koehler